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the court, compromise any controversy arising in the administra.tion of the estate upon such terms as he may deem for
the best interest of the estate..' (11 U.S.C.A;, § 50; 2 Remington on Bankruptcy (5th Ed.) p. 717; 8 C.J.S. 1O~2.) Sinee
approval of the 'court,' rather than of the 'judge' is required, approval of a compromise may be given by the referee.
"But that which is as a matter of law a composition may
not be accomplished without complying with the statutory
. requirements under the guise of being a compromise of controversy. 'This section (§27, 11 U.S.C.A., §50) should not
be confused with section 12 on compositions .. It is intended
to supply a summary and inexpensive way of settling questions arising in the administration of bankrupt estates.' It is
most often used inconncction with contests on claims filed
against the estate, or the contesitJd collections of claims due
the estate. It cannot, of course, be resorted to where the
matter in controversy is the right to a discharge.' (Gilbert's
Collier on' Bankruptcy (one vol., 4th Ed.), p. 570.)
"A 'compromise of controversy' implies a dispute to be
settled. In the case herein the papers in the bankruptcy
proceeding which have been made part of the record in the
present case show a dispute as to whether certain persons
w:ho clairned to be limited partners were in fact general partners. But there is no intimation of any dispute as to the
status of the four general partners, inclUding Raiter and
Oleari. The trustee's petitions described them as general
partners and the stipulation of facts upon which the present action was heard so describes them.
"The petition to comprornise recites that it is doubtful
that the estate can realize from marshaling of the individual assets of Raiter and Oleari a greater sum than they
offered to pay, that is, $7,500, and that 'there is also some
doubt as to the ability of your Trustee to prevail in the said
proceeding to marshal the assets of the said Frank E. Raiter
and. Louis G. Oleari.' However, as to general partners the
authority of the trustee to marshal assets to the end of
applying any surplus remaining after paying individual debts
to partnership obligations exists as a matter of right, unless,
perhaps, where it appt'ars unlikely that any surplus above
individual debts will result. It would seem, therefore, that
on the record the only dispute whieh could exist was whether
liquidation of the individual. assets of Raiter and Oleari
would yield any surplus for partnership creditors. In our
view such a dispute may not be made the subject of a com-
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promise of controversy which will result ·hi· discharge of.
gener:al partners from individual liability' to . partnership
creditors. " .
. '. ,
.'
"To summarize-the court inbankruptcyi:Was withoiIt
jurisdiction to discharge the individual liability of Raiter
and Oleari as general partners except following fun administration in bankruptcy ornpon compositionpr9ceedings
which met. the statutory requirements. The referee's order
was void as a discharge of the individual liability of Raiter
and Oleari. It was void as a composition of creditors under
section 12. of the Act because it lacked confirmation bya
judge. The provision for compromise of .controversies does
not authorize a discharge of the individual liability of apartner to partnership creditors."
Edmonds, J., and Carter, J., concurred.

[L. A. No. 18450. In Bank.

Nov. 2, 1942.]

WILLIAM O. GAMBLE, Petitioner, v. BOARDOFOSTEOPATHIe EXAMINERS OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA et al., Respondents.
[1] Physicians paths.~Bus.

Licenses -

Educational Requirements -

Osteo-

& Prof. Code, § 2493, as amended in 1941, re-

quiring osteopaths to submit, with the annual tax and registration fee, evidence of the completion of 30 hours of educationa] work, is not unreasonable, although there is' no such
requirement applicable to physicians and S:Ql'geons. The Osteopathic Act (Stats. 1923, p. xciii; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1923,
Act. 5727) does not prohibit the Legislature. from imposing
varying requirements on osteopaths and other practitioners
after its adoption as before, so long as the jurisdictions of
the Board of Medical Examiners and the Board of Osteopathic Examiners are not disturbed.

PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel issuance of receipt
for annual tax and registration fee. Writ denied.
[1] See 20 Cal.Jur. 1060; 41 Am. Jur. 166.
McK. Dig. Reference: [1] Physicians and Surgeons, ij 15.
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Roscoe R. Hess for Petitioner.
Paul Vallee and Charles E. Hobart as Amici Curiae on bet .h.alf ()f Petitioner.
'f;>-'1'

.

oiL: John ,L.Brannely for Respondents.
'7'RAYNOR,J.-Petitioner ha:;;; brought this proceeding in
,'mandamus to, compel the respondent board to issue a receipt
A~;,the.pa,Yn.l,ent ~orthecalendar year 1943, of the annual tax
iru;tq registratiolJ, fe!'l,requi:t:edby section 2496 of the Business
;"ap:dPctofessi,o~ 'JCoqe.,
-J',uIl]Se<}tjpp. ~49~,()f. the ,Business and Professions Oode, as
. amended ill 1941 ,(Stats. 1941, chap. 945) requires each person licensed by the osteopathic board to pay an annual tax
and registration. fee and to submit therewith satisfactoryevide~ce thathe has completed during the preceding year a mini, mum, of '30 liours.ofprofessional educational work approved
by the board. 'Petitioner is'a, graduate of an osteopathic school
and holdS a physician and surgeon certificate issued in 1934,
' 'which alltliorizes "the holder to use drugs or what are known
;'as medicaip'riepai-a.tiotmb:l:or: ripon human beings and to sever
;:.~~tI?~J:l~tr~t,e'~~iei"£~i~ejj of human beings. and to ~s~ a~yand
'aU j othermetliods;lll the treatment of dIseases, lllJurIes, de(~6r:i:Qities, orother physical or mental conditions." (§ 2137,
(Btisinessand Professions Code.) He tendered the annual fee
for~he calenqa,r ,ye{!.l' 1943as required by section 2496 of the
)3usiness,' a~c{' PrpfeSsions' Code but declined to submit evi~'~e,nce. of ih~p~~lormance" of 30 hours of professional educa,ti()nal worlt.:Ile contends that since holders of physician and
i'surgeoncertifi,cates, issued by the Board of Medical Examin'"ersarenot required to do annual educational work for the re:'tiewalof their licenses, the requirement of such work of holders
;'of physician and surgeon certificates issued by the Board of
?Osteopathic Examiners violates, in addition to article I, sectiou'2l of the ,California Oonstitution, the Osteopathic Act,
which' cannot be 'amended by the Legislature because it was
adopted by initiative without special provision for its amend·ment. (Oal.Qonst., art. IV.)
,'. Between 1913 and 1922 all physicians and surgeons were
licensed by the Board' of Medical Examiners. Graduates of
all schools recognized by the medical board, whether osteopathic, homeopathic, eclectic or allopathic, were entitled to
take'the physician and surgeon's examination if they met the
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prescribed conditions. The Osteopathi~ Act created a Board
of O~teopathic Examiners and gave it jurisdiction, formerly
residing in the Board of Medical Examiners, over graduates
of osteopathic schools. The act was intended to effect administrative changes only, and made no substantive changes in' the
standards of education and examinatiol;l for the physician and
surgeon certificate. When the Osteopathic Act was adopted
the rights and dutieS' attached to the physician and surgeon
certificate did not vary according to the kind of school from
which the holder graduated. Petitioner argues that since the
Osteopathic Act made the Medical Practice Act applic~ble to
graduates of osteopathic schools such rights and duties re•
main invariable. The Legislature, howeve1', ,is not committed
to a uniform policy in this regard. There is no provision in
the Osteopathic Act limiting its power to change the standards
for receiving or holding a physician and surgeon certificate.
The argumElnt submitted to the voters in support of the act
set forth that it left the Legislature freeto change the standards of education and examination. The act itself demonstrates the care with which its framers guarded tb.at freedom
and ni.~de the act exclusively administrative in character.:
"All persons who' are graduates of osteopathic schools and
who desire to apply for any form of certificateI1lentioned or
provided for in the state medical practice act,approvedJune
2, 1913, and all acts amendatory thereof, shallmakeapplication therefor, to said board of osteopathic examiners and not
to the board of medical examiners of the State ofCali~ornia.
The board of osteopathic examiners in respect to graduates of
osteopathic schools, applying for any form of certificate men~
tioned or provided for in the state medical practice' ~ct, approved June 2, 1913, and all acts an:tendatorythereoi, is hereby authorized and directed to carry out the. terms and provisions of the state medical practice act, approved Jun,e 2,
1913, and all acts amendatory thereof, and all laws hereafter
enacted prescribing and regulating the approval of schools,
the quaJificatwns of applicants for examination for any form
of certificate, the applications for any form of certificate, the
admission of applicants to examinations for any form of certificate, the conduct of examinations, the issuance of any fonn
of certificate, the collection of fees from applicants, the collection of an annual tax and registration fee, the compilation and
issuance of a directory, the revocation of any form of licens~
or certificate, the prosecution of persoriswho attempt to prac-
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'lice ~ithout a ~~rtillc~te, and all other matter$relating to the
groiiu.aies: of JJstcopathic schools, holding or applying lor any
form of cer}ificate or Ucense. Every applicant to said board
o'f osteopathic 'examiners for any form of certificate shall pay
to thesecretaIj-treasurer of the board the fecs prescribed
for such ap:pli~ation by said state medical practice act, approved June 2, ).913, or any acts amendatory thereof or laws
hereafter enacted. Said board of osteopathic examiners shall,
in respect to all the matters aforesaid, relating- to graduates
of osteopathic schools, applying for or holding any form of
certi$.cate or license, take. over, exercise and perform all the
functions and duties imposed upon and heretofore exercised
or performed by the bpard of medical examiners of the State
.of California Under the provisions of the state medical practice act; approved' ,June 2, l!HS, and ac.ts amendatory thereof.
The provision of' .said state medical practice act, approved
June 2, 1913, (l'nd~(f,ct8 amendatory thereof are hereby declared
to be applicabie to said l:Joardof ,osteopathic' examiners.in r.es~e~t to all 'Qf tli~ ~fQresaId matters and all other matters now
Clr hereafter'prescribed bylaw relating' to the g-raduates of
.osteopathic' college~' holding or applying for any form of cer~
tific/i.te or license. In )10 other respects than as herein provided shall the jurisdiction, duties or functions of said board
of Ihedical'examinersofthe State of Oalifornia be in any wise
iilnited or chang-cd; nor shall the board of osteopathic examiner$ have any power or jurisdiction over the graduates of
any other than osteopathic s~hools. From and after the time
of' the organization Of the board of osteopathic examiners
said board ,'of medlcalexaminers of the State of California
shall h~ve'nofurther jurisdiction, ,duties or functions with
respect'tO graduatC$ of osteopathic, schools holding or apply~
,mg:fQf an:y'Jorm 9f certificate or license an:d the, said juris4iction~ dp#~'and functions shall be. assumed ,and performed
·by~said;boara:()f 'osteopathic 'examiners." [Italics ours.]
'(S'tEi~:'l~2a;'p;xciii; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1923, Act 5727;
•Osteopathic 1~ct; ',§ 2.)
"" 'E,1~¥f'r:etere:iice 'in the foregoing' act to the Medical Praciic~~ct is followed immediately bya phrase including ,all
actS,aiqen~~,tory'thereot, Th~ act, moreover, specifically con~
templa.tes,. ~'~~aws ,hereafter enacted'; affecting personsapply~,
,in.g'for"ot)ioldiIlg the, physicia.n and surgeon or other ceriiftcai~;.,'ihcluahig: laws "regulat.ing . . . the issuance of any
fO~Di 'ofc~rtiftl,mte ' ••• the .revocation of any form of license
~ ~ '"i .. ! til.,:

.

.f '.
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all

or certificate . . . and
other matters relating to the graduates ·of osteopathic schools, holding or applying for any form
of certificate or license." The only limitation in the act upon
legislation on these matters is that the administration thereof
in relation to gra,duates of osteopathic schools be by the Board
of Osteopathic Examiners. So long as the respective jurisdictions of the Board of Medical Examiners and Board pf
Osteopathic Examiners are not disturbed, the Legislature remains as free to impose varying requirements on osteopaths
and other practitioners after the adoption of the Osteopathic
Act as before.
The contention that the 1941 amendment to section 2493
of the Business and Professions Code violates article I, section
21 of the California Constitution is based on the theory that
since osteopaths must meet the same educational requirements
as other practitioners and receive the saDie certificate they
cannot be made subject to additional requirements not imposed upon the, others. It is generally recognized, however,
that the power' to regulate the treatment of disease is an
elastid one and that regulations. may vary accord.ing to the
schoolR or methods of practice so long as they. entail no unreasonable discrimination. (In re Rust, 181 Cal. 73 [183 P.
548] i People v. Jordan, l72 Cal. 391 [156 P. 451] ; People
v. Ratledge, 172 Cal. 401 [156 p. ~5J; Ex parte Gerirw, 143
Cal. 412 [77 P. 1{?6,66 L.R.A. 249] ; People v. Mills, 74 Cal.
App.353 [240 P. 296] ; People v. Chong, 28Cal.1\.pp. 121 (151
P, 553.] ; Bohannon v. Board olMedical Examiners, 24 Cal.App.
215 [140P. 1089] ; Crane v. Johnson, 242 U.S. 339 [37 S.Ot.
176; 61 L.Ed. 348] ; see ca.ses cited i1).16 A.L.R. 709.) In the
lig-ht of the foregoing cases the requirement in question in
the, present case cannot be regarded as. unreasonable. In re
Rust, supra, held that: the Optometry Act ()f 1913 (Stats.
1913,p. 1097) forb~dding osteopaths b~tJlot physicians and
surgeons; JrQID, practicing optometry witho.uta license fr0 In
the. State Board of Optometry, did not violate article I, section
21 of the state Constitution. The opinion set ~orth hli;torY
of the distinctions that the Legislatur(\ has inade at various
times between practitioners of osteopathy
other practi-.
tioners, Thus for many years different lice..nses were issued
to osteopaths than to physicians andsurge9ns with differen:t
rights and duties attached to the respectivelieenses. Although
the certificates as well as the edu~ationalreq¢rements for
graduat~1S of osteopathic schools and griloduatelS of m:edieal
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8~hoolsmay:nowbethesame the Legislature is as free to return to differentcertificate.s and educational requirements as
it was 'to' ab'andonthem.
The i>etition'f~r writ of mandate is denied.
GIbson, C.,J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Carter,J., concurred.
' .
"
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,Action to recQver taxes paid;J udgment of dismissal following thesustallling of a demurrer to amended complaint and
plaintiffs; refusal to plead further, affirmed.
Holbrook &Tarr and W; Sumner Holbrook,Jr., f()r Appellants.

j'.'

,,', petitioI).er's application for a rehearing was denied Novem~er ,~O" 1942"" 9~ti.s;:J., and Edmonds, J., voted for a rehearin~.

",

.
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,FIRST'TRUST & SAVINGS BANK OF PASADENA (a
,Banking Corporation) et aI., Appellants, v; THE CITY
OF . PASADENA (a Municipal Corporation), Respondent;
[1] Taxation-Remedies of Taxpayer-,Proceedings in Action-

,an action against a city to recover taxes, an
amended complaint which contains no allegation showing compliance with the claims provisions of the city charter, requirmgpresentation of· "all claims" within six months as requisite to an action on any claim for money or damages against
the city, is insufficient to state a cause of action.
[2] Estoppel.:.....Parties Affected-Municipal Corporations.-In an
action against a city to recover taxes paid, the city was not
estopped from raising the defense of lack of compliance with
the claims provisions of the city charter because of the alleged practice of th~ city officials of making tax refunds in
cases where Claims have n,ot been filed within the period prescribed by the charter. Only in rare cases may the doctrine
of estoppel be invoked against a municipal corporation.
Plead~gs.-In

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Lo!:!
Angeles County. Frank C. Collier, Judge. Affirmed.
'[1] ;See 24 Oal.Jur. 310.
" [2]' See 10 Oa1.Jur. 650; 19 Am.Jur. 820.
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Taxation, § 285; [2] Estoppel,§44.

Harold P. Huls, City Attorney, and H. Burton Noble, AssistantCity Attorney, for Respondent.
THE COURT.-A further study of this case leads us to
the c,onclusion'that the opinion of the District Court of Appeal
rendered when the case was before that court correctly disposes of all questions presented by the record herein. That
opinion written by Mr. Justice Spence of the First District,
Second Division, we therefore adopt as the opinion of this
Court. It is as follows:
Plaintiffs brought this action seeking to recover a portion
of the taxes paid by plaintiffs to the city of Pasadena for
the tax year 1933.1934, which portion was alleged to have
resulted from an over-assessment of plaintiffs' properties
through the use of erroneous methods of valuation. Defendant's demurrer to plaintiffs' amended complaint was sustained. Plaintiffs elected to stand upon said amended complaint and refused to plead further. Thereupon a judgment
of dismissal was entered and from said judgment, plaintiffs
appeal.
,
,
[1] It is conceded by plaintiffs that their amended complaint contained no allegation showing compliance with the
so-called claims provision of the Pasadena charter and that if
compliance with said claims provision was required, then the
ruling of the trial court was correct. Plaintiffs contend, however, that they were not required to allege compliance with
said claims provision of said charter; that their amended complaint was sufficient in all respects; and that the trial court
erred in sustaining said demurrer.
The above mentioned claims provision of the Pasadena
charter is found in article 11 thereof. Said article requires the
presentation of "all claims" within six months and further
provides that unless a claim has been so .presented, "No suit
shall be brought upon any claim for money or damages"
against the city of Pasadena.
Plaintiffs state that the trial court based its ruling on
Far'mersand Merchants Bank of Los Angeles v. City of Los

·'!\i~,,:;.ry;!

